The Hartz reforms, the German Miracle, and labor reallocation by Bauer, Anja & King, Ian
 Accepted Manuscript
The Hartz Reforms, the German Miracle, and Labor Reallocation
Anja Bauer, Ian King
PII: S0014-2921(18)30002-3
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.12.010
Reference: EER 3102
To appear in: European Economic Review
Received date: 21 December 2015
Accepted date: 18 December 2017
Please cite this article as: Anja Bauer, Ian King, The Hartz Reforms, the German Miracle, and Labor
Reallocation, European Economic Review (2018), doi: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.12.010
This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service
to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo
copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please
note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and
all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
The Hartz Reforms, the German
Miracle, and Labor Reallocation
Anja Bauer∗ Ian King†
January 9, 2018
Abstract
We analyse the recent history of unemployment and labor reallocation
in the German economy using a variant of Lucas and Prescott’s (1974)
reallocation model, modified to include unemployment benefits, rest unem-
ployment, and aggregate shocks. We focus on the implied effects of the
Hartz reforms and the Great Recession the model, and compare them with
the corresponding movements in German data. We find that the model’s
qualitative predictions for reallocation and unemployment correspond well
with the observations. When we calibrate the model to assess its quanti-
tative performance, however, we find that it significantly overestimates the
changes of both reallocation and unemployment since the introduction of
the Hartz reforms.
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1 Introduction
Since the turn of the millennium, the German economy has experienced a
remarkable sequence of events which have had a significant impact on the structure
of its labor market, and which have led to some outcomes that have puzzled some
observers. Facing a high and rising unemployment rate (persistently above 10
percent) the German government instituted a series of labor market reforms, known
as the Hartz reforms, phased in over the period of 2003 to 2005. These reforms
were aimed at improving the flexibility of the market, the mobility of workers, and
incentivizing workers to seek work more actively (Jacobi and Kluve, 2007)1. As
shown in Figure 1, starting in 2005, the unemployment rate declined significantly,
dipping below 10 percent for the first time in 2007.
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Figure 1: German unemployment rate from 2000-2014, seasonally adjusted
Source: Federal Employment Agency, Statistics Office, ”Arbeitsmarkt in Zahlen”
1In their classic study, Jacobi and Kluve (2007) identified three ”cornerstones” of the Hartz
reforms: ”increasing effectiveness and efficiency of labour market services and policy measures”,
”activating the unemployed” and ”fostering employment demand by labour market deregulation”.
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In 2008, like most other economies in the world, Germany was hit hard by the
Global Financial Crisis and the Great Recession (GFC, for short). German GDP
fell by 6.6 percent (Q1/2008 to Q1/2009) – a drop even more significant than the
one experienced by the US at the time (Burda and Hunt, 2011). Productivity fell
by a similar percentage – 6.3%, as shown in Figure 2.
However, unlike most countries (including the US) the German unemployment
rate did not rise significantly at that time. As shown, once again, in Figure 1 it
remained remarkably stable – leading some to call this ”Germany’s jobs miracle”
(see, for example, Krugman (2009)). Viewing Figure 1, and considering the fall
in unemployment since that time, it appears that the German unemployment
rate was in a dramatic secular decline when the GFC hit, and this decline was
temporarily suspended – leading to a relatively stable unemployment over the
2008-2010 period.
Figure 2: Labor Productivity per employed, chain-index, base year 2010, season-
ally adjusted, cyclical component of Hodrick-Prescott filter (λ = 1600)
Source: Destatis, Genesis Online Database, ”VGR des Bundes”.
Interestingly, also, although the Hartz reforms were implemented to improve
labor market outcomes through more flexibility and mobility, reallocation rates
across occupations in Germany have been rather stable over the period (Bauer,
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2013; Jung and Kuhn, 2014). Figure 3 presents data on the proportion of job
findings that involved an occupational switch, from 2000-2011. At the beginning
of the millenium, this number was approximately 37%. From 2003-2006 it was
higher, averaging near 40%. It declined back down near 38% over 2007-2009,
and climbed back up near 40%, again, subsequently. Thus, arguably, since the
introduction of the Hartz reforms, there has been a long run increase in the rate
from approximately 37% to approximately 40%, with a short-term interruption,
during the GFC which temporarily reduced it to 38%. 2.
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Figure 3: Share of job findings with occupational switch over all job findings
Source: Own calculations, see Appendix B.
In this paper we argue that this reallocation pattern is qualitatively consistent
with a reallocation model, which is based on Lucas and Prescott (1974), but the
quantitative predictions of the model are quite different from those observed in
the data. In particular, while the model predicts that reallocation would rise in
response to the Hartz reforms, then fall back during the GFC, then recover to
2In Appendix B.1 an alternative measure based on Lilien (1982) is considered, with similar
results.
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levels similar to the post-Hartz, pre-GFC levels, it predicts much more dramatic
swings in reallocation over time.
Following Jovanovic (1987), Gouge and King (1997), Alvarez and Shimer (2011),
and others, we construct a model that includes two types of unemployment: re-
allocation and rest unemployment, where workers can choose to collect benefits
while rest unemployed. Following Jovanovic (1987) and Gouge and King (1997),
the model also includes an aggregate shock, to capture business cycle fluctuations.
Following King (1990), it also includes explicit moving costs, which allows us to
capture some of the key features of the Hartz reforms.
We characterize the stationary equilibrium of the model, focusing on how re-
allocation, rest unemployment, and total unemployment vary over the cycle – and
how these also respond to the changes in benefits and reallocation costs associated
with the Hartz reforms. We then calibrate the model to the period before the
Hartz reforms (and before the GFC) – choosing reallocation costs, Markov switch-
ing probabilities, and productivity levels, to match the observed reallocation rates
and total unemployment rates over the pre-Hartz period. We then reduce benefit
levels and reallocation costs in a way that is quantitatively consistent with the
Hartz reforms, and generate new values for reallocation and unemployment. We
then simulate the effect of the GFC by considering a drop in productivity consis-
tent with the unemployment rate over the GFC period and, once again, compute
the implied reallocation rate.
We find that, holding productivity levels constant, as the Hartz reforms are
introduced, the model predicts a significant decline in rest unemployment (down
to zero) and a dramatic rise in reallocation rates – well beyond the changes in the
observed data. We also find that, as productivity falls due to the GFC, reallocation
rates fall, but not down to the levels in the data. Overall, the model overestimates
the effects of the Hartz reforms on both reallocation and unemployment.
1.1 Related Literature
1.1.1 The German Miracle
Some papers about the ”German labor market miracle” argue that the rela-
tively mild reaction of unemployment to the GFC wass largely due to labor hoard-
ing induced by ”pessimistic expectations” which led to only moderate hiring in
5
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the previous expansion and, thus, fewer workers being laid off when the reces-
sion occured, (Burda and Hunt, 2011, p.314) paired with flexibility in working
hours induced by working time accounts and short-time work (see Burda and
Hunt (2011); Mo¨ller (2010)). However, other studies argue that wage moderation
and the transition to a new (higher) employment level induced by institutional
changes through the Hartz reforms were the main driver (Boysen-Hogrefe et al.,
2010; Boysen-Hogrefe and Groll, 2010). Effectively, we follow the latter strand
of the literature but emphasize a different margin of the ”miracle”: the role of
reallocation and its interaction with the Hartz reforms and the GFC.
1.1.2 The Role of Reallocation
Though a vast literature evaluates the effects of the Hartz reforms on different
labor market outcomes, the effects of these reforms on reallocation have not been
studied extensively. The main aim of the reforms were to decrease long-term
unemployment by increasing labor demand and enhancing labor market flows.
The reform was launched in three waves, as discussed at length in other studies
(see for example, Jacobi and Kluve (2007) and references therein). Here, we focus
on the aspects of the reforms, as discussed in the literature, that one would expect
to have affected reallocation significantly.
In the first wave of reform, training measures were restructured. Previously, the
training system was ”characterized by strong lock-in effects, zero (or even negative)
post-participation effects and substantial dead-weight losses” (Tompson and Price
(2009, p. 227), Fitzenberger (2008)). The change included measures that were
oriented towards labor demand3, where caseworkers now carefully select people
for training (cream-skimming, with a target re-employment rate of 70 percent of
the participants) and where the average duration of the measures was shortened
to prevent lock-in effects. This realignment aimed to help to update workers’ skills
and provide long-term unemployed workers with skills that have stronger demand.
3The ”determination of necessity of further training also considers labor market con-
ditions. This means that the Employment Agency must decide whether e.g. un-
employment could be terminated also without further education, whether other instru-
ments of labour market policies are more promising and whether integration in the
labour market can be expected with sufficient probability with the aspired education
aim” (see https://www.arbeitsagentur.de/ web/content/EN/Benefits/FurtherTraining/Detail
/index.htm?dfContentId=L6019022DSTBAI486073).
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Furthermore, most of these training measures are dedicated to ”further vocational
training (FbW)”. Studies that evaluate measures of further vocational training
find that they improve the prospects of finding a job for the unemployed (Kruppe
and Lang, 2014) and that these training measures lead to a ”higher probability
... of working in a job whose occupational tasks match the occupational field for
which they received vocational training” (Grunau and Lang, 2016). We believe
it is reasonable to presume that the new setup of training measures encouraged
workers to change their occupation which should increase reallocation.
Secondly, the second wave of reform (Hartz III) changed the organizational
structure of the Federal Employment Agency. ”Job Centres” were established
which, generally speaking, aimed at improving the placement processes through a
higher contact rate between unemployed and the placement officers and intensified
advice for long-term unemployed workers. We would expect this to have an impact
on reallocation in two ways: on the one hand, it should improve the placement
process. On the other hand, it might broaden the view for unemployed workers
to search for potential jobs in other fields than their previous profession – again,
leading to more reallocation.
Thirdly, the last (and, arguably, the most important) of the reforms reduced
unemployment compensation for long-term unemployed. Whereas the benefit sys-
tem was ”status preserving” before the reforms, the benefit system for long-term
unemployed workers became means-tested. This introduced financial pressure for
the long-term unemployed. Combined with the change in the regulation for the
”reasonableness” for employment, workers were encouraged to take up jobs in dif-
ferent professions.4 Moreover, under the new regime, if a benefit recipient refuses
to accept a new job then that recipient’s benefit level will be cut, initially, by
30%. If the recipient continues to refuse jobs then his/her benefit payments will
be replaced by in-kind transfers. Thus, under the new regime, many unemployed
workers face the choice of accepting almost any job offered or losing a significant
fraction of their transfers (Lohse et al., 2005, p. 9).
Given the changes in the German labor market through the Hartz reforms,
we find it surprising that the fluctuations in reallocation were not substantial.
4Regulations about the definition of the ”reasonableness” of work, and its implications, have
been controversial. Some have argued that, under current regulations, almost all work is deemed
as ”reasonable”. In particular, a job for an individual is not seen as unreasonable if it differs
from the worker’s previous job or if it is more distant, geographically.
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A closer look on the reallocation rate reveals that, indeed, reallocation increased
to some extent after the Hartz reforms, however this effect appears to be rather
small. The reallocation rate depicted in Figure 3 is calculated on a 2-digit occu-
pational level (KldB88, 84 occupational groups after refinements). The absolute
change between the starting point in January 2000 and December 2010 is below
5 percentage points, which is small compared to other countries. For instance,
Carrillo-Tudela et al. (2016, Figure 4a, dashed line) present the same measure for
occupational reallocation for the UK labor market. They find that the realloca-
tion rate for just 9 different occupations is around 50 percent with changes up to
5 percentage points. Similarly, Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers (2013, Figure 2) find
for 12 different occupations a reallocation rate of 55 percent with changes around
10 percentage points for the US. As we should expect the share of switchers to
rise when the number of occupations under consideration increases, the results for
Germany are not just low in levels but also in fluctuations over time.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we intro-
duce the model, identify its equilibrium allocations, derive the key formulas, and
present the qualitative effects of the Hartz reforms and the GFC on reallocation
and unemployment. In Section 3 we discuss the empirical strategies for choosing
the parameters of the model. In Section 4, we present the quantitative results.
In Section 5 we present our conclusions. Appendices provide additional details on
the data and calculations.
2 The Model
The model is based on Gouge and King’s (1997) adaptation of Lucas and
Prescott’s (1974) model (allowing for both local and aggregate shocks), but differs
from Gouge and King’s model by the introduction of explicit moving costs (as in
King (1990)) when workers reallocate across labor markets. This allows for a more
natural interpretation of the effects of the Hartz reforms.
The economy has a large number of spatially distinct competitive local labor
markets (we will refer to these local labor markets as occupations)5 and a large
5We prefer to interpret each labor market as an occupation although other interpretations
are available, in particular: geographic locations, or sectors. As Fahr and Sunde (2009) point
out ”usually, firms post vacancies for certain qualifications in terms of occupation or education
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number of infinitely-lived risk neutral workers, with an average of l workers per
occupation. Time is discrete and the demand for labor in each occupation is
subject to both local and aggregate shocks. In occupation i at time t, the wage wit
is determined by
wit = γ
i
tθtg(n
i
t) (1)
where γit denotes a local shock, θt denotes the aggregate shock, n
i
t denotes the
employment level in that occupation, and g is an invertible and continuously dif-
ferentiable function, g′(n) < 0, lim
n→∞
g(n) = 0, and lim
n→0
g(n) =∞.
The local and aggregate shocks follow independent first-order Markov pro-
cesses, and each shock can take two values: γ ∈ {γH , γL} where 0 < γL < γH , and
θ ∈ {θH , θL} where 0 < θL < θH . The transition matrix P for the local shocks is
assumed to be symmetric with persistence parameter pi > 1/2 and the transition
matrix Q for the aggregate shock is assumed to be symmetric with persistence
parameter ρ > 1/2. For ease of exposition, we refer to times when the aggregate
shock takes the value θH as ”booms”, and times when it takes θL as ”busts”.
Workers observe all current information, have rational expectations, and choose
their occupations, in each time period, to maximize the expected discounted value
of their income streams, using the discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). Workers can work in
only one occupation at any time and, in any period, are identical except for the
occupation that they start the period in.
Let lit denote the number of workers that start period t in occupation i. The pair
(l, γ) defines the state of an occupation. Let υt(l, γ) denote the equilibrium mass
of occupations with state (l, γ) in time t. In the absence of any aggregate shocks,
a stationary equilibrium exists in this model in which υt(l, γ) is constant over
time.6 In the presence of aggregate shocks, however, a stationary equilibrium of
this type does not typically exist. In environments such as this, with both local and
aggregate shocks, equilibrium behavioral functions may depend on both current
and future distributions over the states of occupations. In this paper, however (as
(which are closely related, given the German dual-track education system), and workers primarily
look for jobs in their occupation. Given the German dual-track education system, with a strong
emphasis on occupational education through the apprenticeship system, occupations are best
suited to capture differences in qualificatory demands, differences in skill requirements, particular
search channels and search intensity, screening problems and matching speed”.
6This is the assumption in the original Lucas and Prescott (1974) model, and in King (1990).
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in Gouge and King (1997)) we restrict attention to regions in the parameter space
where stochastically stationary equilibria exist, where agents need only forecast
the evolution of the exogenous aggregate shocks – so behavioral functions are
stationary.7 We therefore use the triple (l, γ, θ) to index types of occupations, and
re-write equation (1) in the following way:
w(l, γ, θ) = γθg(n(l, γ, θ)) (2)
At the beginning of any period, in any occupation, any worker can choose from
the following three options: work (i.e., supply one unit of labor) in the current
occupation at the prevailing wage w(l, γ, θ), stay in the current occupation but not
work – and collect benefit payment b > 0, or pay an amount κ > 0 to move from
the current occupation to one with a higher beginning-of-period expected value
of wage payments. Following Alvarez and Shimer (2011), workers who choose the
second option are said to experience ”rest” unemployment and, following Lucas
and Prescott (1974), workers who choose the third option are said to experience
”search” unemployment. Since all workers who choose to search are reallocated,
search unemployment is synonymous with worker reallocation in this model.8
Letm(l, γ, θ) denote the number of net migrants in occupations of type (l, γ, θ).9
In any occupation of type (l, γ, θ), then, employment is constrained by
n(l, γ, θ) ≤ l +m(l, γ, θ). (3)
The dynamics of (beginning-of-period) labor supply, in any occupation of type
(l, γ, θ), are determined by
lt+1 = lt +m(lt, γt, θt). (4)
7In the language of Menzio and Shi (2010), these are block recursive equilibria. As pointed
out by a referee, restricting attention to the regions of the parameter space that admit this type
of equilibrium is non-trivial, and other equilibria may exist outside of these regions. However,
the purpose of this exercise is to assess the performance of a reallocation model in the spirit of
Lucas and Prescott (1974), Jovanovic (1987) and Gouge and King (1997) – all of which implicitly
restrict attention to block recursive equilibria. While we consider studying equilibria outside of
this class to be an interesting exercise, we also consider this to be beyond the scope of this paper.
8See Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers (2013) for an interesting model where these two are dis-
tinct, due to the existence of search within occupations. We discuss the implications at the end
of the paper.
9Note that m(l, γ, θ) may be positive, negative, or zero.
10
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
Let V˜ (l, γ, θ) and V (l, γ, θ) denote the expected value, for a worker, associated
with an occupation of type (l, γ, θ), before any migration takes place, and after
any migration takes place, respectively. Thus:
V˜ (l, γ, θ) = max{b, γθg(l)}+ βE [V (l′, γ′, θ′)|l, γ, θ] (5)
V (l, γ, θ) = max{b, γθg(l +m(l, γ, θ))}+ βE [V (l′, γ′, θ′)|l, γ, θ] . (6)
Now, let λ(θ) denote the expected value that a worker receives if that worker
chooses to move, which depends on the value of the aggregate shock θ. Individual
workers in occupations of type (l, γ, θ) make the following decisions:
If V˜ (l, γ, θ) ≤ λ(θ)− κ the worker is willing to move
If V˜ (l, γ, θ) > λ(θ)− κ the worker will stay (7)
Assuming that all workers who move are allocated so that, in equilibrium, they
are indifferent about whether or not they moved,10 this decision rule implies the
following migration rule in occupations of type (l, γ, θ):
If V˜ (l, γ, θ) ≤ λ(θ)− κ then m(l, γ, θ) ≤ 0 so V (l, γ, θ) = λ(θ)− κ
If V˜ (l, γ, θ) > λ(θ) then m(l, γ, θ) > 0 so V (l, γ, θ) = λ(θ)
If λ(θ)− κ < V˜ (l, γ, θ) < λ(θ) then m(l, γ, θ) = 0 so V (l, γ, θ) = V˜ (l, γ, θ)
(8)
2.1 The Stationary Equilibrium
We start by defining what we mean by a stationary equilibrium in this setting.
Definition 1 A stationary equilibrium, given an initial distribution over the state
υ0 and an initial value for the aggregate shock θ0, is a collection of functions
V (l, γ, θ), w(l, γ, θ), n(l, γ, θ), m(l, γ, θ), λ(θ), and a distribution υt such that:
a) Workers are choosing their occupations to maximize the expected value of
their income streams V (l, γ, θ). That is, (7) and (8) are satisfied, given (5)
10That is, in an occupation where some workers leave, workers continue to leave until the
equilibrium wage in that occupation is driven up to the point where workers are indifferent
about leaving or not, as is standard in migration models.
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and (6).
b) Wages w(l, γ, θ) are determined by (2).
c) Employment n(l, γ, θ) is determined by (3).
d) Migration m(l, γ, θ) and the value λ(θ) are determined by (8) and aggregate
net migration
∫
m(l, γ, θ)dν = 0.
e) Local labor force dynamics are determined by (4).
f) The following condition is satisfied for the distribution:
υt+1 =
∫
1{l+m=l′}(l)P (γ′|γ)vt(dl, dγ).
In this paper we restrict attention to equilibria where both rest unemployment
and search unemployment exist in both booms and busts. This requires certain
restrictions on the parameters. In particular, the benefit amount b and the moving
cost κ must be in a certain range. Let nLH and nLL denote employment levels in
low productivity occupation in booms and busts, respectively. In equilibrium,
these are determined where the wage is equated, in each case, with the benefit
payment:
γLθHg(nLH) = γLθLg(nLL) = b. (9)
Given (9), as will become clear, the following conditions are sufficient for the co-
existence of reallocation and rest unemployment in booms and busts:
γHθHg(2l − nLH) < b+ [1 + β(1− 2pi)]κ < γHθLg(l) (10)
where nLH is determined in (9).
In this restricted equilibrium all workers in high productivity occupations are
employed and some workers in low productivity occupations choose rest unemploy-
ment, in both booms and busts. The equilibrium value functions for any occupa-
tion can take only four possible values {VHH , VLH , VHL, VLL} where the first and
second subscripts refer to the values of the local and aggregate shocks respectively.
Similarly, the equilibrium local labor force values for each type of occupation are
given by {lHH , lLH , lHL, lLL} . Using these values in (6), we have:
VHH = γHθHg(lHH) +
β {ρ [piVHH + (1− pi)VLH ] + (1− ρ) [piVHL + (1− pi)VLL]} . (11)
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VLH = b+
β {ρ [piVLH + (1− pi)VHH ] + (1− ρ) [piVLL + (1− pi)VHL]} . (12)
VHL = γHθLg(lHL) +
β {ρ [piVHL + (1− pi)VLL] + (1− ρ) [piVHH + (1− pi)VLH ]} . (13)
VLL = b+
β {ρ [piVLL + (1− pi)VHL] + (1− ρ) [piVLH + (1− pi)VHH ]} . (14)
Also, given these restrictions, the migration rule (8) implies:
VHH = VLH + κ (15)
and
VHL = VLL + κ (16)
Using equations (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), and (16), we can solve for the
following unique equilibrium values for the variables:
VHH = VHL =
b+ (1− βpi)κ
1− β (17)
VLH = VLL =
b+ β(1− pi)κ
1− β (18)
γHθHg(lHH) = γHθLg(lHL) = b+ [1 + β(1− 2pi)]κ (19)
It may appear puzzling that the value functions in (17) and (18) are indepen-
dent of the value of the aggregate shock – only the local shock matters for the value
of an occupation. This follows, though, from (15) and (16) and our restriction that
we are in the region of the parameter space where both reallocation and rest unem-
ployment exist in both booms and busts. Together, these imply that there are only
two possible wages in the economy. In low productivity occupations (regardless
of the aggregate shock), the equilibrium wage is driven equal to the value of the
13
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benefits: b. In high productivity occupations (again, regardless of the aggregate
shock) workers earn more but the premium is determined purely by the migration
rules (15) and (16). As given in (19), wages in high productivity occupations are
equal to b+[1 + β(1− 2pi)]κ. This is the wage in the low productivity occupations
b plus the moving cost κ adjusted by discounting and the probability of switching
productivity. As the economy moves (for example) from a boom to a bust the ag-
gregate levels of employment and output both decrease. However, in this case, due
to the fact the relative wages for workers in high and low productivity occupations
are unchanged as the economy moves from boom to bust, the fact that workers in
low productivity occupations receive the same payoffs whether they are working or
not, and the fact that the fractions of high and low productivity occupations are
independent of the aggregate shock, the equilibrium (i.e., post-migration) values
associated with being in a high productivity occupation (and with being in a low
productivity location) are independent of the aggregate shock.
Thus, we can write the equilibrium wages as:
wLH = wLL = b (20)
wHH = wHL = b+ [1 + β(1− 2pi)]κ (21)
Although wages are independent of the aggregate shock, labor supply and
employment levels in each occupation are not. The values of lHH and lHL are
determined by (19) and can be found by inverting the function g(·) in each case:
lHH = g
−1
(
b+ [1 + β(1− 2pi)]κ
γHθH
)
(22)
lHL = g
−1
(
b+ [1 + β(1− 2pi)]κ
γHθL
)
(23)
With lHH and lHL determined, we can find the values of lLH and lLL easily. In
the stationary equilibrium, with the symmetric transition matrix P , we know that
half of the occupations draw high productivity and half draw low productivity.
With the average population per occupation being l, we obtain:
lLH = 2l − lHH (24)
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lLL = 2l − lHL (25)
Also, employment levels are equal to population levels in high productivity
occupations:
nHH = lHH (26)
nHL = lHL. (27)
Employment levels in low productivity occupations are determined from (9):
nLH = g
−1
(
b
γLθH
)
(28)
nLL = g
−1
(
b
γLθL
)
(29)
We can now make a complete ordering of employment and population levels in
the different types of occupations.
Lemma 1 In the stationary equilibrium:11
nLL < nLH < lLH < lLL < lHL = nHL < lHH = nHH . (30)
Proof. From (22) and (23), since θL < θH , it is clear that lHL < lHH .
12 Given
this, (24) and (25) imply that lLH < lLL. From (28) and (29) it is also clear
that nLL < nLH . Now, using the right hand side of (10) and the right hand
side of (19) we get γHθLg(l) > γHθLg(lHL), which implies: l < lHL. Using this in
(25) we get: lLL < lHL. Now, from the left hand side of (10) and (19), we have
γHθHg(2l − nLH) < γHθHg(lHH). This implies that 2l − nLH > lHH . Using (24),
this implies that 2l − nLH > 2l − lLH , or nLH < lLH . Finally, using (26) and (27)
we have the result.
11From this point forward, we restrict attention only to the stationary equilibrium where
the above restrictions hold. Thus, when we refer to the stationary equilibrium it should be
understood that the restrictions apply.
12Note that our assumption that g′(·) < 0 implies that g−1′(·) < 0.
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2.2 Reallocation and Unemployment Over the Cycle
We are now in a position to analyse the values of reallocation, rest unem-
ployment, and total unemployment in the stationary equilibrium, and examine
how they vary over the cycle. The following lemma provides formulas for these
variables.
Proposition 1 In the stationary equilibrium, per occupation, for j = H,L :
a) Reallocation in the boom (denoted rH) and in the bust (denoted rL) are given
by rj = (nHj − l)(1− pi).
b) Rest unemployment in the boom (denoted UH) and in the bust (denoted UL)
are given by Uj = l − (nHj + nLj)/2.
c) Total unemployment in the boom (denoted TUH) and in the bust (denoted
TUL) are given by TUj = rj + Uj.
Proof. Part (a): In the stationary equilibrium, one half of occupations draw high
productivity and one half draw low. Also, a proportion (1−pi) of low productivity
occupations switch to high in the next period. Thus, .5(1− pi) occupations switch
from low to high productivity in any period. These are the only occupations that
draw new workers in any period. We know that each of these occupations starts
that period with lLj workers and, from (25) and (24), lLj = 2l−lHj. In equilibrium,
at the end of the period, each of these occupations has the population lHj. Thus, the
number of new workers in each of these occupations is lHj− (2l− lHj) = 2(lHj− l).
Multiplying this by the fraction of occupations of this type .5(1 − pi) we have
rj = (lHj − l)(1− pi). Finally, using (26) and (27) we have the result.
Part (b): The average population per occupation is l. One half of these occupa-
tions draw high productivity and have employment nHj. The other half draw low
productivity and have employment nLj. The remainder l − (nHj + nLj)/2 choose
rest unemployment.
Part (c): This holds by the definition of total unemployment.
We can now identify the cyclical properties of reallocation and unemployment.
Corollary 1 In the stationary equilibrium:
a) Reallocation is procyclical: rL < rH .
b) Rest unemployment is countercyclical: UH < UL.
c) Total unemployment is countercyclical: TUH < TUL.
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Proof. Part (a): From Proposition 1, rL − rH = (1− pi)(nHL − nHH). The result
then follows from Lemma 1.
Part (b): From Proposition 1: UH−UL = [(nHL−nHH) + (nLL−nLH)]/2. The
result then follows from Lemma 1.
Part (c): From Proposition 1: TUH − TUL = (nHH − nHL)(1− pi − 1/2)−
(nLH − nLL)/2. The result follows from Lemma 1, since pi > 1/2.
These results are similar to those found in Gouge and King (1997), and for
similar reasons. From Proposition 1, it is clear that reallocation is proportional to
the employment level in high productivity occupations. This is higher in booms,
because the larger value of θ in booms requires a higher employment level to
drive the wage in high productivity locations down to its constant value b + [1 +
β(1− 2pi)]κ (implicitly, through the diminishing marginal product of labor). Rest
unemployment is lower in booms because this is decreasing in the employment
levels in both high and low productivity occupations, which are higher in booms.
Reallocation and rest unemployment move in different directions over the cycle
but their sum, total unemployment, is countercyclical, being influenced more by
rest unemployment than reallocation.
2.3 The Qualitative Effects of the Hartz Reforms
As described in subsection 1.1.2, generally speaking, as outlined above, there
were three major initiatives in the Hartz reforms. From the first initiative the
quality of training was improved which, should reduce the cost, to the worker, of
training. In the model, this is represented by a decrease in the cost of reallocation,
κ. The second change was aimed at improving the efficiency of the placement
process of the Federal Employment Agency (FEA). Through the reorganization of
the responsibilities in the public employment services, a reduction in the number
of unemployed workers per job adviser was achieved. This should have helped the
workers to receive more appropriate job offers. In the model, this means, once
again, κ is reduced. The third initiative consolidated unemployment assistance for
long-term unemployed with social assistance benefits to means-tested unemploy-
ment benefit (UB II), while insurance-based unemployment benefit (UB I) were
mainly unchanged. Essentially, that led to a reduction in the average level of un-
employment benefits b. We now consider each of these effects, in turn, using the
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model.
2.3.1 Training Subsidies and Improvements in the FEA
Both the change in the training subsidies and the improvements in the place-
ment process of the FEA reduce the cost of moving, κ, in this model. From
Proposition 1 and the chain rule, it is straightforward to derive the following, for
j = H,L.
∂rj
∂κ
=
(1− pi) [1 + β(1− 2pi)]
γHθjg′(nHj)
< 0 (31)
∂Uj
∂κ
= − [1 + β(1− 2pi)]
2γHθjg′(nHj)
> 0 (32)
∂TUj
∂κ
=
(1/2− pi) [1 + β(1− 2pi)]
γHθjg′(nHj)
> 0 (33)
Thus, the training subsidies and improvements in the placement process (by
reducing moving costs) increase reallocation and reduce rest unemployment. These
effects are both very intuitive: with moving costs reduced, more workers choose
to move – reallocate – and, consequently, fewer workers choose to stay in their
current occupations for rest unemployment, and collect benefits when times are
bad for their current occupation. These effects work in opposite directions on total
unemployment, but the downward pressure of rest unemployment outweighs the
effect on reallocation, so total unemployment falls.
2.3.2 Reducing Unemployment Benefits
To consider the effects of the reductions in average unemployment benefits,
once again, we can use Proposition 1 and the chain rule to derive the following.
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∂rj
∂b
=
1− pi
γHθjg′(nHj)
< 0 (34)
∂Uj
∂b
= − 1/2
γHθjg′(nHj)
− g
−1′(b/γLθj)
2γLθj
> 0 (35)
∂TU
∂b
=
1/2− pi
γHθjg′(nHj)
− g
−1′(b/γLθj)
2γLθj
> 0 (36)
Intuitively, a reduction in unemployment benefits makes rest unemployment
less attractive in an occupation hit by hard times – so fewer workers stay and
more workers choose to relocate themselves to more productive occupations. Once
again, these effects work in opposite directions on total unemployment, but the
downward pressure of rest unemployment outweighs the effect on reallocation, so
total unemployment falls.
2.3.3 The Overall Effects of the Hartz Reforms
According to this theory, then, the expected effects of all three of the major
Hartz reform initiatives would be to increase reallocation and decrease both rest
unemployment and total unemployment. Improved training subsidies, enhanced
efficiency of the FEA, and reductions in unemployment benefits all have the same
qualitative effects on these economic variables. This, of course, is what we observed
in the German economy subsequent to the introduction of these reforms over 2003-
2005. Referring, once again, to Figure 1, the unemployment rate fell dramatically,
after 2005, stabilized briefly during the GFC period of 2007-2009, then resumed
its fall from 2010 onwards. Figure 3 also shows that reallocation increased slightly
(from roughly 37% to 40% of job findings) when the Hartz reforms were first
introduced, then decreased back down during the GFC, and rose back up to roughly
40% by 2010.
Qualitatively, then, this model is consistent with the experience of the German
economy over the entire period. We now turn to consider the question of the
quantitative performance of the model over the same period.
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3 Calibration
In the following section we divide our observation period into four sub-periods,
which we call ”regimes”. Regime I runs from 2000-2003, covering the time before
the Hartz reforms were introduced and Germany faced a high unemployment rate,
and low reallocation rate. Regime II runs from 2003-2006, when the Hartz reforms
were introduced, and the economy experienced an increase in the reallocation rate
and a decrease in unemployment. Regime III covers the GFC: running from 2007 to
2009, where the reallocation rate declined, the secular decrease in unemployment
slowed down and productivity dropped. Finally, Regime IV covers the period after
the Hartz reforms and the GFC, when the reallocation rate increased again and
unemployment started to decline further, while productivity reverted back to the
pre-GFC levels.
According to this definition, our empirical targets are the following:
Table 1: Overview of targets
reallocation rate unemployment rate
Regime I 0.3740 0.0983
Regime II 0.3985 0.1101
Regime III 0.3836 0.0830
Regime IV 0.4002 0.0768
3.1 Before the Hartz reforms - Regime I
For the parameterization of the model we target the empirical values for the re-
allocation and the unemployment rate in the first regime by choosing reallocation
costs, Markov switching probabilities, and productivity levels. We use equations
22) - (29) in combination with Proposition 1 for this purpose. For the functional
form of g, we assume the following: g(nt) = αn
(α−1)
t , where we set α according
to labor’s share in Germany (0.62, see , for example, Karabarbounis and Neiman
(2014)).
The discount factor β is set to 0.9625 which corresponds to an average interest
rate on long-term government bonds of 3.9 percent (see Appendix E). The value l¯
denotes the average workforce per occupation. We divide the average labor force
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over the observation window by the number of occupations under consideration
(84 occupations, 2-digit KldBB88 classification). This yields a value of 848,000
workers. To assess the level of unemployment benefits in the period before the
Hartz reforms, we take the average replacement rate before 2005, which was ap-
proximately 60% and multiply by the average annual wage over the period (see
Appendix F and C for details). This gives us a value of 21,850 Euros.
We then chose reallocation costs κ, the productivity levels γHθH and γLθH and
the Markov switching probability pi such that the ranking in Lemma 1 is full-
filled. Accordingly κ then amounts to 9,559 Euros,γHθH to 6,684,280 and γLθH to
5,651,561. This implies a ratio between γL and γH of 0.85, meaning that low pro-
ductivity occupations are 15% less productive than high productivity occupations.
The persistence parameter for the local shocks, pi, is set equal to 0.9750.
3.2 After the Hartz reforms- Regime II
We introduce the Hartz reforms by lowering both the unemployment benefits
(b) and the reallocation costs (κ) as described above. To measure the change in the
level of unemployment benefits, we follow existing studies that evaluate the impact
of the Hartz reforms. However there is more disagreement than consensus in the
calibration of this parameter and its impact in the reduction of the unemployment
rate. While Krause and Uhlig (2012) find that the reduction of unemployment
benefits account for a drop of 2.8 percentage points in unemployment, Krebs and
Scheffel (2013) find that the effect amounts rather to 1.4 percentage points and
Launov and Wa¨lde (2013) find a very low impact of 0.3 percentage points. As
pointed out by Launov and Wa¨lde (2013), this range is caused by the calibration
of the unemployment benefit cut: the stronger the cut, the higher the impact on
the unemployment rate13. They conclude that ”modest numbers of an average
benefit reduction under 10 percent ... appear empirically more convincing than
the assumption of extreme cuts” (Launov and Wa¨lde, 2013, p. 26). Following this
conclusion, we calculate the reduction in unemployment benefits as a 10 percent
cut from the benefit level before the Hartz reforms. This yields a reduction in the
unemployment benefit level of 2,185 Euros (in real terms) to 19,665 Euros.
13Krebs and Scheffel (2013) assume a reduction about 11 percentage points from 0.57 to 0.46,
Launov and Wa¨lde (2013) find a reduction of 7 percentage points and Krause and Uhlig (2012)
use cuts ranging between 70 and 30 percent.
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For the change in κ we measure the decrease from peak to trough in the series of
the inverse for average training costs per participant, which implies that moving
costs decreased about 30 percent. This gives us a new moving cost level of 7,259
Euros.
The implied unemployment rate out of this calibration is 1.1 percent, and the real-
location rate (the share of job findings that involved an occupational switch) is 100
percent. In this setting, rest unemployment falls completely to zero. This result is
caused by the fact that the drop in both unemployment benefits and moving costs
is large enough to extinguish rest unemployment – so that all unemployment, in
this setting is due to search and reallocation.
3.3 After the Hartz reforms during the GFC- Regime III
To calibrate the GFC we lower the productivity levels, γHθH and γLθH , to γHθL
and γLθL so that we match the unemployment rate of 8.3 percent over the period.
The implied values for γHθL and γLθL are 6,025,210 and 5,094,317 (preserving the
ratio γL/γH to be, once again, 0.85). This yield a reallocation rate of 51 percent,
which is again significantly higher than observed in the data (38.4%).
3.4 After the Hartz reforms, after the GFC- Regime IV
Productivity recovered in this period and so Regime IV and Regime II are
equivalent in the way the model is calibrated. In both cases, the calibration has
high productivity and low (post-Hartz) values for benefits and reallocation costs.
Thus, the outcomes for reallocation and unemployment in Regime IV are the same
as in Regime II. This is consistent with the view that the decline in unemployment
subsequent to the Hartz reforms in 2005 was interrupted by the GFC, but resumed
after 2009. Furthermore, the result implies that the Hartz reforms, in combination
with a high labor productivity, were sufficient enough to eliminate rest unem-
ployment and reduce the unemployment rate in the long run to approximately 1
percent, according to the model. 14
14For an overview of the calibration exercise, see Appendix G.
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3.5 Summary of the calibration results
Table 2 shows our quantitative results in comparison to the data. It is clear
that, once again, the model is able to mimic the evolution, qualitatively, of the
reallocation rate over time, namely an increase from Regime I to II, a decrease from
Regime II to III, and a further increase from Regime III to Regime IV. However,
quantitatively, the range of values is too high. According to the data, as the
German economy moved from Regimes I to II, it experienced a mild increase of of
approximately 3 percentage points of the reallocation rate. The model predicts an
increase that is much higher (63 percentage points). This also makes it impossible
to target the unemployment rate given in the data, since rest unemplyment drops
to zero in the model in Regime II. While our model predicts an unemployment
rate of 1.1 percent, the unemployment rate in the data amounts to 11.0 percent.
Furthermore the drop in the reallocation rate going from Regime II to Regime
III amounts to 2 percentage points in the data, while it is around 50 percent
in the model. Hence the reallocation rate in the model is much more volatile
than in the data. The reason here is that the drop in unemployment benefits is
strong enough to extinguish wait unemployment, which increases the reallocation
rate to 100 percent. In the long-run, ceteris paribus, the model predicts that
unemployment might drop to 1.1 percent in Germany (see Regime IV) and so the
reallocation rate is 100 percent. This clearly overstates the fall in unemployment
and the share of job findings that involve occupational switching. Presumably,
a key contributing factor for the overestimation of reallocation is that our model
abstracts from unemployment due to search within occupations. In this model,
search is synonymous with reallocation. In a more general model, which includes
search within occupations, the share of job findings due to occupational switching
would not be 100%, even if rest unemployment were zero.
Table 2: Overview of results
reallocation rate unemployment rate
model data model data
Regime I 0.37 0.37 0.098 0.098
Regime II 1.00 0.40 0.011 0.110
Regime III 0.51 0.38 0.083 0.083
Regime IV 1.00 0.40 0.011 0.077
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4 Conclusion
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that uses a Lucas and
Prescott (1974) reallocation model for policy evaluation of the Hartz reforms in
Germany15. We found that the the model predicts that the reduction in unem-
ployment benefits and decrease in reallocation costs of the Hartz reforms in the
long-run should significantly reduce unemployment in Germany, as has been ob-
served. Studies that evaluate the impact of the Hartz reforms typically emphasize
the role of the reduction in unemployment benefits (Krause and Uhlig, 2012) and
the role of the improvement in the efficiency of the FEA (Launov and Wa¨lde, 2013).
Our model has similar implications, and we also find that the relative importance
of the reduction in moving costs is rather limited compared to the reduction in
unemployment benefits.
Our model has the advantage that it explicitly addresses structural unemploy-
ment, which was the kind of unemployment the Hartz reforms, arguably, aimed
to reduce. Furthermore it examines the link between reallocation and unemploy-
ment. While the model successfully captures with this link qualitatively, it has
less success quantitatively. One reason for that might be that our model allows for
just two types of unemployment: unemployment within islands (wait unemploy-
ment) and unemployment across islands (search unemployment). Although the
drop in unemployment benefits is calibrated conservatively, it is strong enough to
eliminate wait unemployment from the model. Other models, e.g. Carrillo-Tudela
and Visschers (2013), feature search not just across but also within islands. This
additional type of unemployment might be the key to reconcile the model predic-
tions with the data qualitatively as it prevents within-island unemployment from
being eliminated.
We believe that further work, which examines this link between unemployment
and the role that reallocation plays in response to aggregate shocks, more generally,
is warranted.
15Other studies use search models according to Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) or search and
matching models a la Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides Diamond (1982a,b); Mortensen (1982a,b);
Pissarides (1985); Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
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A Sample of Integrated Employment Biographies
(SIAB) of the Insitute for Employment Re-
search (IAB)
The Sample of Integrated Employment Biographies (SIAB) of the Insitute for
Employment Research (IAB) covers about 80 percent of the German workforce,
excluding civil servants and self-employed. It contains individual employment and
unemployment benefit records, episodes for job search and participation in training
measures from 1975 to 2010. Next to the common workers characteristics, such as
age, gender, nationality, education and vocational training, the data set contains
information on the wage, full vs. part-time, the occupation, the industry and a
firm identifier, which allows to expand the sample for firm characteristics. The
episodes are partly overlapping or even parallel as they are coming from different
sources. For example, there might be parallel spells if a workers is receiving un-
employment benefits while on a training measure, or is searching for a job but not
(yet) receiving unemployment benefits. One advantage of this data set it that the
spells are accurate on a daily basis, which allows us to also construct time series
and variables such as tenure (firm, occupation, industry).
In this paper, in all our calculations with the SIAB, we define employment as
working as a full-time employee (excluding self-employed, family assistants, civil
servants, regular students and trainees) and unemployment as actively searching
for a job and being available (excluding sickness up to 6 weeks, on the job search
and registration at the Federal Employment Agency for seeking advice). To han-
dle parallel notifications, we exclude unemployment benefit receipt, periods in
active labor market measures and spells of workers on maternity leave. See vom
Berge et al. (2013) for details on the data and http://fdz.iab.de/en/FDZ_Data_
Access.aspx for information on how to access this data.
B Calculation of reallocation rate
The data used to calculate the measure of reallocation is a similar sample to
the SIAB, however with a higher sampling rate of 5%. We used this higher sam-
pling rate, in order to be able to observe transitions between unemployment and
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employment (and vice versa) on a very disaggregated level without meeting lower
bounds of observations. To calculate the measure of reallocation with that sample,
we first count the number of transitions between unemployment and employment
(job findings) between consecutive months (evaluated at the 10th of each month).
Secondly, we count the number of job findings that occur in a different occupation
than the one the worker had in the previous employment spell. For this procedure
we rely on the 2-digit classification of occupations (KldB88, almost 100 occupa-
tions16). Note, that we are only interested in whether the occupation is different
or not, but not to which occupations worker switch to and come from. We then
seasonally adjusted the data to calculate the following statistics:
rrt =
JFt|o=switch
JFt
(37)
We then smoothed this monthly statistic by using a 13-month centered moving
average filter. For calculating the alternative measures of reallocation we relied on
the same sample and the same selection criteria.
B.1 Alternative measures and details on reallocation
To check whether the ”reallocation puzzle” holds under another measure of
reallocation, we constructed Lilien’s (1982) employment dispersion index across 2-
digit occupations. While the measure used in the body of the paper relies on gross
flows across occupations, Lilien’s (1982) measure relies on net flows. To be more
precise, Lilien (1982) measures the weighted sum of employment growth deviations
across occupations. As can be seen in Figure 4, this alternative measure shows the
same picture: A modest increase in reallocation in the mid of the 2000’s.
This can also be confirmed by looking at reallocation at a longer time horizon.
Figure 5 shows the reallocation rate for Germany since the 1980’s. While large
movements occurred in the 90’s and after 2010, the period between 2000 and 2010
is remarkably stable, which is extraordinary since this is the period where the most
comprehensive labor market reforms in the history of Germany happened.
Differences between this graph and the previous one are a result of different
16 https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/Navigation/Statistik/Grundlagen/Klassifikation-der-
Berufe/KldB1975-1992/KldB1975-1992-Nav.html
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Figure 4: Alternative reallocation measure based on Lilien(1982)
notions of unemployment. While Figure 3 (see main text) uses data on regis-
tered unemployment, Figure 5 relies on unemployment benefit receipt to proxy
unemployment.
C Wages and Occupations
We also use the SIAB to generate a wages series from 2000 to 2010, aggregated
and for every occupation. We restrict the analysis to wages of full-time employees
(excluding self-employed, family assistants, civil servants, regular students and
trainees) and deflate them by the German consumer price index. As the wage
information in these data is censored we impute wages using interval regressions
that control for the workers’ age and its square, firm tenure, occupational tenure,
general labor market experience, education, and occupational status (white-collar,
blue-collar, etc.). We impute the wage separately for men and women, for East
and West Germany, and by year. The aggregate time series (monthly) given this
procedure is as given in Figure 6.
We also generate time series for every occupation in the 2-digit occupational
classification. We do so by averaging the wages across all individuals in a certain
occupation at a certain month. We exclude occupations that show less than 20
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Figure 5: Share of job findings with occupational switch over all job findings –
long series
Figure 6: Wage series, 2000 - 2010, Euros, non-seasonally adjusted
observations on average over the period, which leaves us with 84 occupations.
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D Reallocation Costs
To measure the change in moving costs, we use the inverse of the average ex-
penditures per participant on training measures that aim at ”further occupational
training” provided by the Federal Employment Agency. We then multiply this
change by the average expenditure on further occupational training per partic-
ipant. The measure is rather a proxy as it does not cover the expenditures of
people that do training without funding of the Federal Employment Agency. We
assume that workers face the same costs as the Federal Employment Agency for a
training measure. As the training system was already changed in 2003, the data
Figure 7: Reallocation costs 2000 - 2010
appears to be at odds with what we expected. The time series shows an increase
in the reallocation costs around 2003/2004, and a decrease (what we would have
expected) only after 2006. This might reflect that the change in the system took
some time to be realized and that the instruments were not used instantaneously
by the unemployed workers as supposed. The training system was reorganized
by giving training vouchers to the unemployed. However, in the beginning not
all of these vouchers were redeemed17. Also, training measure (often) have long
durations, hence the full effect of appears years later. Hence, we account for that
17Not all of the vouchers were redeemed, because e.g. workers were not sure which measure to
choose or applied for measures that didn’t reach a critical amount of participants (Fitzenberger,
2008, p. 15).
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longlasting implementation lag by considering the drop from the peak in 2006 to
the trough 2009.
E Discount Factor
The discount factor is calculated as 1/(1 + r), where r refers to the yield of the
current 10 year federal bond (Bundesbank, 2015). This bond yield is available from
October 2001 until recently on a daily basis. We averaged this yield to a yearly
measure which spans the period from 2001 to 2010. The average yield amounts to
3.9 percent and is decreasing over time.
Figure 8: Discount factor 2001 - 2010
Source: Bundesbank (2015), own illustration.
F Replacement Rate
The data from the the DICE (Database for Institutional Comparisons in Eu-
rope) (2013) provided by the CESIfo Group Munich reports the average net un-
employment benefit replacement rate in the period 2001 to 2010. In detail the
measure is calculated as the average over 67 percent and 100 percent of the aver-
age worker’s earnings level and for different family types (single, the only earner
in a married couple, or married to another earning person, with and without chil-
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dren etc..) (CESifo, 2005). The average worker corresponds to an adult full-time
worker whose wage earnings are equal to the average wage earnings.
Figure 9: Average net replacement rate over time
The time series shows a decrease in the replacement rate over time from 60 to
44 percent with a substantial drop from 2003 to 2005 which reflects the effects of
the Hartz reforms.
G Overview of Calibration
The following table gives an overview of the parameter setting and the results
given the targets as outlined in the sections above.
Table 3: Overview of parameters
pi α κ b γHθH γLθH γHθL γLθL
Regime I 0.9750 0.62 9,559 21,850 6,684,280 5,651,561
Regime II 0.9750 0.62 6,691 19,665 6,684,280 5,651,561
Regime III 0.9750 0.62 6,691 19,665 6,025,210 5,094,317
Regime VI 0.9750 0.62 6,691 19,665 6,684,280 5,651,561
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